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In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a location in order to
attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on
the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive
assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of
a given graph. A proﬁle of location choices is called a ‘‘robust equilibrium’’ if it is a Nash equilibrium
in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a ﬁnite number of
players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a complete characterization of robust equilibria
and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical obser-
vations of minimal differentiation and inefﬁciency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we ﬁnd strong sup-
port for an old conjecture that in equilibrium ﬁrms form local clusters.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In his classic example, Harold Hotelling illustrates competition
in a heterogeneous market by two ﬁrms that consider where to
place their shop on a main street (Hotelling, 1929). Ever since, this
model of spatial competition has inspired a tremendous amount of
research in various disciplines. Starting with Downs (1957), it is
used to analyze the positioning of political candidates competing
for voters (e.g., Mueller, 2003; Roemer, 2001) and to analyze the
positioning of products in order to attract consumers (e.g.,
Carpenter, 1989; Salop, 1979). In the year 2013 alone, Hotelling
has been cited more than 450 and Downs even more than 1100
times.1 Moreover, the model implication of minimal differentiation
is known far beyond scholarly circles. In this paper, we want to chal-
lenge a fundamental aspect of the Hotelling–Downs approach.
Throughout the literature (of spatial competition), it has been
virtually always assumed that consumers or voters who prefer
the same position fully agree upon the ranking of the other alter-
natives, i.e., they have identical preferences or utility functions.
This very strong homogeneity requirement can be considered as
driven by the assumption that all consumers/voters use the same
distance measure since in the standard Hotelling–Downs set-up(dis)utility is represented by the distance between positions. In
particular, if two people prefer the same option, in any spatial rep-
resentation with homogeneous distances they necessarily rank all
the other alternatives in the same order. This is hard to justify
when we think of voters of the same political party who disagree
about the second-best party, or of consumers with the same favor-
ite brand but disagreement about the ordering of two other brands.
And even in the case of geographic location choices the require-
ment appears to be challengeable if the distances represent travel
time, for instance.2 As a matter of fact, these simple cases already
exceed the scope of almost any model of locational competition.
Consider, for example, a poll on a group of voters about their
favorite tax rate. The answers can be displayed as locations on a
line. Location games that capture this application consider classi-
cally two political candidates who strategically choose a tax rate
which they propose to the voters. Thereby it is standardly assumed
that (a) each voter casts his vote for the candidate that is closest to
him and (b) all voters asses the distances between the candidates
homogeneously. In combination these two assumptions are not
at all innocuous. As indicated above, they hide the homogeneity
requirement that all voters who consider a tax rate of 10%, for
instance, as their favorite alternative, are supposed to rank any
two tax rates, like 2% and 20%, for example, in exactly the sameng uphill
hat there
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result that two vote-maximizing candidates choose the median
location (Hotelling, 1929) stands apparently on highly question-
able grounds. A way to avoid this issue would be to ask the partic-
ipants in the poll not only about their favorite tax rate, but about a
full ranking of the alternative tax rates. Apart from practical prob-
lems, the downside of such an approach is the informational
requirement that political candidates know the full assessment of
every voter. That is, we have replaced a questionable requirement
by another one. A solution to this issue relates back to the seminal
contribution of Black (1948). He examined single-peaked prefer-
ences on a line, which has the same effect as voters who are
allowed to asses the ‘‘distances’’ between different tax rates indi-
vidually. Black’s result that under single-peaked preferences the
median voter wins in majority voting against any other alternative
has the following implication for the situation of spatial competi-
tion outlined above: in any location game that is consistent with
the poll, both candidates choose the median tax rate in equilib-
rium. In that sense the classical result is robust.
The example on tax rates illustrates that in two-player location
games on a line the questionable requirement of homogeneous dis-
tance perceptions is not driving the ﬁnal outcome. However, for all
other cases – in particular, for more than two players and for
multi-dimensional spaces – robustness of the results is an open
problem. If one can show that the model assumption is not driving
the results, then the model is put on a solid foundation. This issue,
although fundamental, seems to have been overlooked in the – rich
and exciting – history of location games.
In this paper we want to scrutinize for given outcomes of spatial
competition whether they rely on homogeneous distance percep-
tions or not. To this end, we formalize individual distance percep-
tions as individual edge lengths of a graph.3 A formal description of
consumers/voters of this type leads to a non-cooperative game
between p players, which are interpreted as ﬁrms or political candi-
dates. In this game, players simultaneously choose a location in
order to maximize the number of agents (i.e., consumers/voters)
they can attract. An equilibrium is then called robust if it is an equi-
librium for all possible distance perceptions that are based on the
same underlying structure (a line, for example). In other words,
our modeling approach boils down to deﬁning a stronger notion of
equilibrium which we call robust equilibrium. It is deﬁned directly
on the situation of spatial competition, i.e., the underlying space
and the distribution of agents (such as the poll on tax rates). For-
mally, several of location games correspond to the same situation
of spatial competition, one for each setting of individual distance
perceptions; and a robust equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in any
of these games. In particular, it is also a Nash equilibrium in the stan-
dard case of homogeneous distances.
A key result for our analysis is the characterization of robust
equilibria by four conditions which are jointly necessary and sufﬁ-
cient. It is based on partitioning the underlying space into ‘‘hinter-
lands’’ and ‘‘competitive zones’’. Applying this result allows us ﬁrst
of all to judge which of the standard results are robust. In fact, we
ﬁnd that several outcomes do not depend on the assumption of
homogeneous distances, but others do.
In the second part of the paper, we examine general properties
of robust equilibria. Among them is the central issue of minimal
differentiation (e.g., d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, & Thisse, 1979; de3 This can be shown to be equivalent to the assumption of single-peaked
preferences on certain domains. For example, if the underlying structure is a line
graph, then this assumption is equivalent to the standard notion of single-peaked-
ness. An alternative model variation would keep the assumption of homogenous
distances but add a set of nodes (which we call ‘‘dummy nodes’’) to make the graph
more ﬂexible. As we show in Appendix B, this model variation would undermine the
model’s explanatory power.Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, & Thisse, 1985; de Palma, Hong,
& Thisse, 1990; Eaton & Lipsey, 1975; Economides, 1986; Król,
2012; Meagher & Zauner, 2004). It turns out that robust equilibria
satisfy a local variant of minimal differentiation, i.e., they induce
reduced games in which the corresponding players are minimally
differentiated. This result provides strong support for the ‘‘princi-
ple of minimal clustering’’ which has been proposed in the seminal
contribution of Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Indeed, for any number of
players, any underlying structure, and any distribution of agents,
robust equilibria are characterized by clusters of players. That is,
the players are jointly located on what we show to be the appropri-
ately deﬁned medians of local areas. Based on this result, we dis-
cuss the welfare implications for consumers and observe that
almost all robust equilibria are not Pareto efﬁcient. Consumers
would unambiguously improve if some ﬁrm would be relocated
appropriately. We ﬁnally, elaborate on the conditions for the exis-
tence of robust equilibria. We analyze how the spatial structure
and the distribution of consumers/voters guarantee, admit, or pre-
clude the existence of robust equilibria. Interestingly, two very
common assumptions in the literature – (a) uniform distribution
of consumers/voters and (b) one-dimensional space such as cycle
or line structures – are mutually exclusive in the sense that for
higher numbers of players robust equilibria require that one of
them is not satisﬁed.
1.1. Related literature
There is an immense body of literature on spatial competition.
While the original Hotelling–Downs framework is restricted to a
one-dimensional space, a uniform distribution of agents, and only
two players, many authors have attempted to relax these restric-
tions. To do so, one branch of the literature has followed a contin-
uous modeling approach within the Euclidean space Rk (e.g.,
d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Economides, 1986), while a second
branch replaces the Euclidean space by a graph (e.g., Labbé &
Hakimi, 1991). Because the history of both branches is rich and
long, providing a summary which covers all of it would exceed
the scope of our paper. We restrict ourselves here to list several
surveys on the topic and to discuss the most closely related works.
A broad overview and taxonomy of literature on spatial compe-
tition can be found in Eiselt, Laporte, and Thisse (1993). Based on
ﬁve components (the underlying space, the number of players,
the pricing policy, the rules of the game, and the behavior of the
agents) the authors provide a bibliography for competitive location
models. While this summary is not limited to certain subbranches,
more speciﬁc surveys have been written on spatial models of con-
sumer product spaces (Lancaster, 1990), on spatial competition in
continuous space (Gabszewicz & Thisse, 1992), on spatial models
of political competition (Mueller, 2003; Osborne, 1995), on compe-
tition in discrete location models (Plastria, 2001), on sequential
competition (Eiselt & Laporte, 1997; Kress & Pesch, 2012), and on
one-stage competition in location models (Eiselt & Marianov,
2011; ReVelle & Eiselt, 2005).
Although there are many variations and relaxations of spatial
competition, virtually all of the models rely on the assumption of
homogeneous distance perceptions. For instance, asymmetric
transportation costs (e.g., Nilssen, 1997) do not alter the assump-
tion. In order to examine to which extent this standard simpliﬁca-
tion is driving the results we will focus on the ﬁrst stage of
Hotelling’s game, i.e., we will investigate the location choices of
the players but we will not include additional variables such as
prices. Similar approaches have been used, for example, by Eaton
and Lipsey (1975), Denzau, Kats, and Slutsky (1985), and Braid
(2005) who also concentrate on spatial competition by assuming
ﬁxed (and equal) prices. Nevertheless, extending our approach to
a two-stage game would be a potential next step for further
Fig. 1. Deletion of nodes.
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model of spatial competition has been attempted by a few studies
only. Among them are de Palma et al. (1985, 1990) and Rhee
(1996) who ﬁnd that ambiguity about consumers’ (or voters’)
behavior may lead to minimal differentiation. More speciﬁcally,
they show that if the consumers’ preferences do not only depend
on prices and distances but also on inherent product characteris-
tics and, furthermore, the ﬁrms have incomplete information about
consumers’ tastes, then Hotelling’s main result can be restored
under certain conditions. This conclusion is not conﬁrmed in
closely related models where the authors assume that the exact
position of demand is unknown (e.g. Król, 2012; Meagher &
Zauner, 2004, 2005). Thus, the validity of minimal differentiation
under heterogeneous agents is still an open problem and the same
holds true for the main implications, for example, that spatial
competition generically does not lead to socially efﬁcient
outcomes. However, the previously cited publications differ from
our work in at least two important aspects. First, in these works,
players are assumed to have a probability distribution for the
behavior of agents. In our work, uncertainty is not explicitly
modeled but only enters implicitly as robust equilibria do not
depend on speciﬁcation details about the agents’ behavior. Second,
the way we model and interpret heterogeneity differs from the
approaches of the other authors. In our setting, the agents apply
individual distances to compare speciﬁc product variations but
the preferences do not depend on inherent product characteristics.
To model this in a convenient way we use a graph-based approach.
We believe that our deﬁnitions are more intuitive in discrete
spaces than in the plane and that this approach helps to highlight
the difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous agents.
However, the main questions of our work are not restricted to
graphs and thus our contribution should also be interesting in a
more general context. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
paper that assesses robustness of equilibria in location games with
respect to different distance perceptions.
From a technical point of view, the model of Eiselt and Laporte
(1991, 1993) is heavily related to ours. In these publications, the
authors show for homogeneous agents that the two-player and
three-player cases on trees always result in some kind of minimal
differentiation. We will check whether this is also true in our more
general context of more than two players and arbitrary graphs.
More recently, Shiode and Drezner (2003) studied the two-player
case on trees under sequential location choices and stochastic
demand. Further recent contributions, to name but a few, deal with
terrorism (e.g., Berman & Gavious, 2007) or stem from computer
science (e.g., Godinho & Dias, 2010; Jiang, Leyton-Brown, & Bhat,
2011; Mavronicolas, Monien, Papadopoulou, & Schoppmann,
2008). Still, the issue of heterogeneous distances is not addressed
in these publications.2. The model
Our modeling approach proceeds in two steps. First we con-
sider, as usual, a non-cooperative game between players (the
ﬁrms/candidates) who are able to occupy a position or object.
The agents (consumers/voters) are still attracted by the player(s)
located closest to them but now their distance perceptions may
be assessed on an individual basis. More speciﬁcally, the agents
agree on the underlying space which is modeled by means of a
graph (Section 2.1), but in our setting they may individually mea-
sure the similarity between the objects (Section 2.2). Then, in the
second step, we study whether equilibria of the game are robust
with respect to perturbations of the distance perceptions. To this
end, roughly speaking, we fully abandon the distances. This means
formally that an outcome is called robust if it is an equilibrium forall possible edge lengths of the same underlying graph (Sec-
tion 2.3). If this is satisﬁed, the outcome is completely independent
of individual distance perceptions and then the standard case of
homogeneous distances is a well-justiﬁed simpliﬁcation.
2.1. Deﬁnitions of graphs
An undirected graph ðX; EÞ consists of a set of vertices or nodes X
and a set of edges E where each edge is a subset of the vertices of
size two. Let X be a ﬁnite set of size nP 2. For brevity, we write
xy or yx for an edge fx; yg 2 E. Given a graph ðX; EÞ, we denote by
Nx :¼ fy 2 Xjxy 2 Eg the set of neighbors of a node x. The number
of edges/neighbors is its degree degx :¼ jNxj. Furthermore,
Y#X n fxg is neighboring to x 2 X if there exists some y 2 Y with
xy 2 E.
A path from x 2 X to x0 2 X in ðX; EÞ is a sequence of distinct
nodes ðx1; . . . ; xTÞ such that x1 ¼ x; xT ¼ x0, and xtxtþ1 2 E for all
t 2 f1; . . . ; T  1g. A set of nodes Y #X is said to be connected if
for any pair y; y0 2 Y there exists a path between the two nodes.
A set of connected nodes is called a component if there is no path
to nodes outside of this set, i.e., C#X is a component of ðX; EÞ if it
is connected and for all x; x0 such that x 2 C and x0 2 X n C there
does not exist any path. A graph that consists of only one compo-
nent is called connected because then there is a path between any
two nodes. Throughout the paper, we will restrict attention to con-
nected graphs. An important class of such graphs is the class of
trees. Trees are connected with n 1 edges or, equivalently, in a
tree each pair of vertices is connected by a unique path.
A node-weighted graph is a triple ðX; E;wÞ, where w :¼
ðwxÞx2X 2 Rnþ is a vector of weights. We write wx for the weight of
node x 2 X and wðYÞ ¼Py2Ywy for the weight of a set of nodes
Y#X. The weightwwill be determined later on by the distribution
of agents.
Now, let ðX; E;wÞ be given. An important operation in graphs is
to delete a set of nodes Y#X and all involved edges:
ðX; EÞ  Y :¼ ðX n Y; EjXnYÞ with EjXnY ¼ fxy 2 Ejx; y 2 X n Yg. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
The operation ðX; EÞ  Y leads to a graph with potentially sev-
eral components and we denote them by CY1 ;C
Y
2 ;    ;CYlY such that
wðCY1ÞP wðCY2ÞP   P wðCYlY Þ. If lY > 1 and jYj ¼ 1, say Y ¼ fxg,
the node is called a cut vertex (cf., e.g., Diestel, 2005) and we write
Cxk instead of C
fxg
k . In this case, for the number of components it
holds that it is not greater than the degree of x. A connected set
of nodes B#X is called a block if there is no cut vertex in
ðX; EÞ  X n B ¼ ðB; EjBÞ and B is maximal with respect to inclusion,
i.e., B ( B0#X implies that there exists a cut vertex in ðB0; EjB0 Þ. That
is, a set of nodes is a block if the induced subgraph cannot be
decomposed into multiple components by deleting single nodes
and it is not possible to ﬁnd a larger subgraph with this feature.
Fig. 2. Three players on a cycle graph.
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vertex. The set of blocks of a given graph is denoted by B and
b :¼ jBj is the number of blocks.
2.2. Perceived distances and players’ payoffs
In the following, the elements of X are called objects and are
interpreted, according to the three applications, as geographical
locations, political platforms or product speciﬁcations. Let
N ¼ fi1; . . . ; ing be a ﬁnite set of agents who have a favorite object
x^i 2 X. As usual, the graph ðX; EÞ is used to represent the relations
between the objects as they are perceived by the agents.4 In order
to be as general as possible we impose no further requirements on
the structure of the graph, but typical examples from literature are
lines, cycles or lattices, to name but a few. In contrast to previous
works, we assume that perceptions are subjective to some extent.
Formally, for each i 2 N there are edge lengths ðdieÞe2E > 0 that repre-
sent his individual estimation of distances between the nodes, such
that, for example, die need not coincide with d
j
e.
5 Given d :¼ die
 i2N
e2E
,
agent i’s perceived distance diðxÞ to an object x 2 X is the length of
the shortest path(s) from the favorite object x^i to x, where the length
of a path is the sum of its edge lengths:
diðxÞ :¼min
XT1
t¼1
dixtxtþ1
 ðx1; . . . ; xTÞ is a path from x^i to x
( )
:
We set diðx^iÞ ¼ 0 for all i 2 N. Note that two agents with the same
favorite object, i.e., x^i ¼ x^j, might have different perceptions about
the distances to the other objects. As usual, we will assume a ‘‘dis-
tance-based behavior’’ of the agents, i.e., agent i 2 N weakly prefers
an object x 2 X over y 2 X if and only if diðxÞ 6 diðyÞ. In other words:
his utility is decreasing in distances. Thus, the preferences of agent
i 2 N are completely determined by his favorite object x^i and his
individual edge lengths die
 
e2E
.6 With the assumption that die ¼ dje
for all i; j 2 N and any e 2 E, we obtain the standard model, where
distance perceptions are homogeneous.
In addition to the objects and agents, we consider a set of play-
ers P :¼ fc1; . . . ; cpg of ﬁnite size pP 2. To ease the distinction
between agents and players we will use the male form for agents,
while players are assumed to be female. Each c 2 P is supposed to
occupy an object x 2 X. Formally, the strategy set for each player
c 2 P is Sc ¼ X, such that a strategy is an object sc 2 X. Let
S ¼ Sc1      Scp . Given a strategy proﬁle s 2 S, let px 2 N be the
number of players whose strategy is x 2 X. Furthermore, let UiðsÞ
be the set of players who are perceived as closest by agent i 2 N,
i.e., UiðsÞ ¼ c 2 P diðscÞ 6 diðscÞ 8c 2 P
n o. Note that we loosely4 For reasons discussed in Appendix B, we do not allow for ‘‘dummy nodes,’’ that is,
we do not consider the possibility of adding further nodes to the graph which are not
objects.
5 The interpretation for geographic locations is as follows: the agents agree on the
underlying graph (a road map, for example) but they are heterogeneous in terms of
assessing or evaluating the edge lengths (the travel time, for example). If the graph
does not represent geographic distances, but policy spaces or the perception of
brands, it seems to be an even more unrealistic assumption that all agents use the
same distance measure, as motivated in the introduction.
6 There is a justiﬁcation for this type of preference which neither deals with
differing edge lengths nor with distance-based behavior. Agents can be assumed to
have single-peaked preferences on the graph as they were deﬁned for lines (Black,
1948) or trees (Demange, 1982). Such preferences ﬁnd broad acceptance and play a
crucial role in the literature on social choice (see, e.g., Moulin, 1980). The alternative
formulation with single-peaked preferences is, in fact, equivalent to the (quite
different) formulation here. The proof for this claim can be requested from the
authors.speak about the perceived distance to a player c 2 P instead of
the distance to the player’s chosen object sc 2 X. We assume that
each agent is allocated to the player which is perceived as closest.
If multiple players are perceived as closest by some agent, then he
is assumed to be uniformly distributed among these players. Thus,
given a strategy proﬁle s 2 S, player c’s payoff UcðsÞ is the mass of
agents who perceive object sc as closest to their favorite object, i.e.,
the payoff of c 2 P is given by pcðsÞ ¼Pi:c2UiðsÞ 1jUiðsÞj. A proﬁle of pay-
offs is denoted by pd :¼ ðpcdÞc2P :¼ ðpcÞc2P , where the subscript d
indicates that the payoffs depend on the individual edge lengths
d ¼ die
 i2N
e2E
.
2.3. Equilibrium notions
Fix a graph ðX; EÞ and a set of agents N such that for each agent
i 2 N we have a favorite object x^i 2 X and individually measured
edge lengths die
 
e2E
. Then a normal form game is given by
Cd ¼ ðP; S;pdÞ. The game is indexed by d to emphasize that the pay-
offs, and therefore the game depends on the individual edge
lengths. The main goal of our work is to examine to which extent
this restriction determines the outcome of the standard setting,
which is the special case of homogeneous distances. A Nash equi-
librium of the game Cd is also called a locational (Nash) equilib-
rium (cf. Eiselt & Laporte, 1991, 1993). Thus, s 2 S is a locational
equilibrium if for all c 2 P and for all x 2 X we have
pcðsc; scÞP pcðx; scÞ.
Example 1. Consider a cycle graph ðX; EÞ on six nodes, i.e.,
X ¼ fx1; x2; . . . ; x6g and E ¼ fx1x2; x2x3; . . . ; x6x1g. Let N ¼ fi1;
i2; . . . ; i12g be a set of twelve agents with favorite objects
ðx^1; x^2; . . . ; x^12Þ ¼ ðx1; x1; x2; x2; . . . ; x6; x6Þ. We ﬁrst assume homo-
geneous edge lengths, i.e., for all i 2 N we have die ¼ 1 for any e 2 E.
Together with a set of three players P ¼ fc1; c2; c3g this constitutes
a game Cd.
The graph ðX; EÞ is illustrated in Fig. 2. The number within a
node indicates the number of agents who have this node as the
favorite object. The edge lengths are not represented. Finally, the
three squares represent the strategy proﬁle ðs1; s2; s3Þ ¼ ðx1; x3; x5Þ.
We will keep these conventions in the following ﬁgures.
For this game, results of Mavronicolas et al. (2008) imply that
the depicted strategy proﬁle s is a locational equilibrium. A player
cannot improve by relocating, because her payoff either remains 4
(when deviating to a neighbor) or decreases. This result, however,
Fig. 3. Example for deﬁnitions: decomposition into competitive zones and
hinterlands.
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one of the two agents with favorite object on x2 assigns a different
length to an edge next to him, such as ~d3x1x2 ¼ 1  for some  > 0
and ~d3e ¼ 1 for all other edges. The perceived distances of the other
agents are assumed to stay the same. Then the depicted strategy
proﬁle s is not a locational equilibrium. The player c3 2 P with
strategy x3 now has an incentive to deviate to x2 or x4 because in
both cases she would attract four agents instead of only 3.5. Thus,
the strategy proﬁle s 2 S is a locational equilibrium in the game Cd
but not in the perturbed game C
~d. In some sense the proﬁle is not
‘‘robust’’.
The previous example motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Robust equilibrium). A strategy proﬁle s 2 S is a
robust equilibrium if it is a locational equilibrium for any collection
of individual edge lengths. In other words: s 2 S is a locational
equilibrium in Cd for any d ¼ die
 i2N
e2E
.
Certainly, robustness is a strong requirement. But it is a desir-
able property for at least two reasons. First, a robust equilibrium
is independent of the assumption of homogeneous edge lengths
but includes this as a special case. Indeed, a robust equilibrium is
also a locational equilibrium in the homogeneous case Cd, where
die
 
e2E
is the same for all agents i 2 N. Second, to determine the
locational equilibrium one has to specify for each agent her favor-
ite object x^i 2 X as well as her list of edge lengths die
 
e2E
together
with a graph ðX; EÞ. On the other hand, to determine robust equilib-
ria it is sufﬁcient to know the graph ðX; EÞ and the distribution of
favorite objects ðx^iÞi2N . In fact, it is sufﬁcient to have only informa-
tion about the node-weighted graph that is induced by ðx^iÞi2N , i.e., it
is enough to know ðX; E;wÞwherewx :¼ fi 2 Njx^i ¼ xg
  is the num-
ber of agents having x as their favorite object. We will interpret an
exogenously given node-weighted graph ðX; E;wÞ as a situation of
spatial competition.3. Robustness
Wewill ﬁrst give a characterization of robustness which applies
to test whether locational equilibria are robust. Then, we will turn
to properties of robust equilibria, in particular minimal differenti-
ation and efﬁciency. Finally, we will reconsider the existence of
robust equilibria.
3.1. Characterization
In this subsection we provide the necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for a strategy proﬁle to be a robust equilibrium. For this
purpose we need additional deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2. Let ðX; EÞ be a graph and ﬁx a strategy proﬁle s 2 S.
Furthermore, let X ¼ Spc¼1fscg#X be the set of occupied nodes in s.
 The hinterland Hx#X of node x 2 X is the set of nodes that have
x on every path to any x0 2 X. In the special case where all play-
ers choose the same strategy (i.e., jXj ¼ 1), say X ¼ fxg, we
deﬁne Hx :¼ X.
 An unoccupied zone Z#X is a component of ðX; EÞ  X. The set of
all unoccupied zones is denoted by Z.
 An unoccupied zone Y#X is called a competitive zone if it is not
contained in any hinterland, i.e., YHx for all x 2 X. The set of
all competitive zones is Y.
 Two distinct objects x; x0 2 X are indirectly neighboring if there
exists a competitive zone to which both nodes are neighboring. The neighboring area Ax#X of x 2 X is the unoccupied zone
which would be obtained when removing all players located
on x. Formally, that is Ax ¼
S
Z2Zx Z [ fxg, where Zx :¼ Z 2f
Zj Z neighboring to xg.
The notions of hinterland and competitive zone go back to Eiselt
(1992) who has deﬁned them for the positions of two players. The
hinterland Hx#X consists of the node itself and possibly several
unoccupied zones that are adjacent to x 2 X but not to any other
occupied node in X. Agents who have their favorite object in Hx
must be closer to player(s) on node x than to all other players, since
any path, and therefore also the shortest one(s), contain this object.
This is different for competitive zones. Players surrounding a com-
petitive zone Y 2 Y compete with indirectly neighboring competi-
tors over the agents who have their most favorite object in Y. The
deﬁnitions are illustrated in Fig. 3, where there are two occupied
nodes x; x0 2 X, several unoccupied zones, where one of them (Y)
is a competitive zone, and another one (Z) belongs to a hinterland.
Furthermore, the neighboring area Ax#X consists of the hinterland
Hx and the competitive zone Y, while the neighboring area Ax0 con-
sists of the other hinterland Hx0 and the competitive zone Y. Gener-
ally, each node either belongs to one hinterland or to one
competitive zone. This can be considered as a partition of X into l
hinterlands (i.e., jXj ¼ l) and k competitive zones
PðsÞ ¼ fHx1 ; . . . ;Hxl ;Y1; . . . ;Ykg: ð1Þ
In fact, because every agent with favorite object in Hx#X is
always closer to a player on the corresponding node x than to
any other occupied node, wðHxÞpx is the ‘‘worst-case payoff’’ that a
player who chooses x receives (recall that px is the number of play-
ers on node x). Conversely, the maximal payoff of a player who
chooses x is restricted by the neighboring area Ax#X, i.e., by
wðAxÞ
px
.
These simple considerations lead to the following key proposition.
Proposition 1. Let s 2 S be a strategy proﬁle on a node-weighted
graph ðX; E;wÞ and let PðsÞ be the corresponding partition as in (1).
Furthermore, let bZ 2 argmaxZ2ZwðZÞ be a heaviest unoccupied zone.
Then s is a robust equilibrium if and only if the following four
conditions are satisﬁed for all x 2 X:ð1:Þ wðHxÞ
px
P wðbZÞ;
ð2:Þ wðHxÞ
px
P
wðAx0 Þ
px0 þ 1
8x0 2 X n fxg:
Furthermore, if px ¼ 1:
ð3:Þ wðYÞ ¼ 0 8Y 2 Y; Y #Ax;
ð4:Þ wHx P wðAx
0 Þ
px0
8x0 2 X ðindirectlyÞ neighbored to x:Proof. We show ﬁrst that the four conditions are jointly necessary.
Then, in the second step, we turn to sufﬁciency.
Fig. 4. A node-weighted line graph with two players.
7 This requirement also implies that the weight of unoccupied zones can never be
higher than the average payoff of the players, i.e., wðZÞ 6 np for all Z 2 Z.
8 A simple implication of this requirement is that in robust equilibria the number of
players on occupied nodes is roughly proportional to the weights of the hinterlands:
px
px0 þ1 6
w Hxð Þ
w Hx0ð Þ 6
pxþ1
px
for all x; x0 2 X.
9 We say that a competitive zone Y is trivial if no agent has his favorite object there,
i.e., wðYÞ ¼ 0.
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nodes X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xlg and assume px ¼ 1 where x 2 X. Let c 2 P be
the player with sc ¼ x.
We ﬁrst establish that x is not neighboring a non-trivial
competitive zone, i.e., wðYÞ ¼ 0 for all Y 2 Y neighboring to x. To
see this suppose the opposite is true. Fix some arbitrary object
y 2 Y . Because Ax#X is connected, it is possible to ﬁnd edge
lengths die
 
e2E for all i 2 N with x^i 2 Ax n Y such that d
iðyÞ < diðx0Þ
for any occupied position x0 2 X neighboring to Ax. This implies
diðxÞ < diðyÞ since every path in Ax from x^i to y passes through x.
Furthermore, for all j 2 N with favorite object in Y we can choose
edge lengths die
 
e2E such that d
jðyÞ < djðx00Þ < djx, where x – x00 2 X
is some occupied position also neighboring to Y. Then the payoff of
player c is pcdðsÞ ¼ wðAxÞ wðYÞ < wðAxÞ ¼ pcdðy; scÞ. Since she
can now beneﬁcially deviate, s is not a robust equilibrium.
Furthermore, if s 2 S is robust, an isolated player c 2 P may
never have an incentive to deviate to a directly or indirectly
neighboring position x0 2 X. Because the weight of all competitive
zones surrounding x equals 0, pcðsÞ ¼ w HxðsÞð Þ ¼ wðAxÞ for all
perceptions of distances. Suppose c relocates to x0. Similar as
before, it is possible to construct individual distances die
 
e2E for all
i 2 N such that every agent with favorite object in Ax0 or Ax strictly
prefers x0 to any other occupied position, i.e., pcdx
0; sc ¼ wðAx0 ÞþwðAxÞpx0 þ1 .
But this implies
pcðsÞ ¼ wðHxÞ
P
wðAx0 Þ þwðHxÞ
px0 þ 1
8x0 ðindirectlyÞ neighboring to x:|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
highest possible payoff at occupied and ðindirectlyÞ neighboring nodes
() wðHxÞ
P
wðAx0 Þ
px0
8x0 ðindirectlyÞ neighboring to x:
ð2Þ
Now let px P 1. Because s 2 S is supposed to be a robust equilib-
rium, it is not possible to perturb distances in such a way that a
player can increase her payoff. This implies that the payoff she
attains at least has to be greater than the highest possible gain
she can reach if she deviates. With similar arguments as in the case
px ¼ 1 this yields
w Hxð Þ
px|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
worst-case payoff at x
P wðbZÞ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
best-case payoff at unoccupied nodes
;
where bZ 2 Z is the heaviest unoccupied zone, and
w Hxð Þ
px
P
wðAx0 Þ
px0 þ 1
8x0 2 X n fxg:|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
best-case payoff at already occupied nodes
ð3Þ
If px ¼ 1, (2) already implies (3) for directly and indirectly neighbor-
ing objects.
Sufﬁciency: Now assume the requirements given in the propo-
sition are satisﬁed. We have to show that the strategies where px
players locate at x 2 X constitute robust equilibria. First consider
the case px ¼ 1, i.e., a singly occupied node. Conditions ð3:Þ and ð4:Þ
make sure that the player cannot improve by deviating to a
neighboring competitive zone or by deviating to a directly or
indirectly neighboring occupied node. Condition (1.) assures that
she cannot improve by deviating to any other unoccupied zone andby Condition (2.) she cannot improve by deviating to any other
occupied node. Now, let px > 1. For a player located on x 2 X,
Condition (1.) assures that he cannot improve by deviating to any
other unoccupied zone and Condition (2.) assures that he cannot
improve by deviating to any other occupied node. h
Proposition 1 provides the requirements for a strategy proﬁle to
be a robust equilibrium. It consists of four straightforward condi-
tions. The ﬁrst one formalizes that deviations into unoccupied
zones are never beneﬁcial. Even if the players only receive their
worst-case payoff, i.e., the weight of their hinterland, they never
gain from relocating into any Z 2 Z.7 Similarly, Condition (2.) cap-
tures that deviations to already occupied nodes x0 2 X are not bene-
ﬁcial. The highest possible payoff a deviating player could get is
wðAx0 Þ
px0 þ1.
8 These two previous considerations must be strengthened
when considering certain deviations of an isolated player because
her node becomes unoccupied then. Again, we distinguish between
deviations into a neighboring zone and deviations on occupied
nodes, which is reﬂected by Conditions (3.) and (4.). The main intu-
ition is that for some distance perceptions an isolated player would
attract only her hinterland, but by deviating she could receive her
former hinterland and, in addition, the weight of some competitive
zone (Condition (3.)). By deviating on a directly or indirectly neigh-
boring occupied node she can not only share the payoffs of the play-
ers on this node, but would also regain some share of her former
hinterland (Condition (4.)). For competitive zones neighboring a sin-
gly occupied node this means that their weight must be zero. We
have already seen an example where this condition is violated. In
Example 1 there are several singly occupied nodes which are neigh-
boring a non-trivial competitive zone (cf. Fig. 2).9 Thus, we can
immediately conclude that the given strategy proﬁle is not a robust
equilibrium.
The main importance of Proposition 1 is that it provides a con-
venient tool for verifying whether a strategy proﬁle s 2 S (which
might be a Nash equilibrium for speciﬁc edge lengths) constitutes
a robust equilibrium or not. A straightforward procedure is to (i)
determine the partition PðsÞ, (ii) compute the weights of the hin-
terlands and competitive zones, and (iii) check if the four condi-
tions characterizing a robust equilibrium are satisﬁed. In
particular, since such an algorithm proceeds in quadratic time,
ﬁnding a robust equilibrium is computationally as complex as ﬁnd-
ing a locational equilibrium. In the remainder of this subsection we
will check the robustness of some prominent results from litera-
ture. We thereby focus on the class of trees and return to cycles
and more general graphs in Section 3.4.
Hotelling’s main result for two players on a continuous line is
that both cluster on the so-called median. This ﬁnding is driven
by the fact that both players tend to the center of the line to steal
agents from the other player. This is illustrated for a discrete line in
Fig. 4 where we can observe the incentive to increase the hinter-
land by moving to the discrete analog of the median.
Fig. 5. A robust equilibrium with no player on the median and without minimal
differentiation.
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ðX; E;wÞ is a node q 2 X that balances the node weights, i.e.,
wðCq1Þ 6 wðXÞ2 ¼ n2, where Cq1 2 Z is the heaviest component of
ðX; EÞ  fqg.
In general, a median need not exist. For example, if we consider
the complete graph where all weights are equal to one, we have
wðCq1Þ ¼ n 1 > n2. Nevertheless, one can show that if ðX; EÞ is a tree,
a median always exists.10
The most direct way to extend Hotelling’s model to graphs is to
consider trees. Although this is only a special case of our set-up,
much attention has been devoted to this particular class in litera-
ture. Among others, Eiselt and Laporte (1991) examined this set-
ting and they have shown that in the two-player case for
homogeneous distances both players will locate on the median of
the tree. Thus, they came to the same conclusion as Hotelling
did. In fact, this result had already been established by Wendell
and McKelvey (1981) in slightly different terms. In their publica-
tion the authors show that for homogeneous distances on a tree
the median is always a Condorcet winner.11 Since a Condorcet win-
ner cannot be beaten in majority voting (by deﬁnition), choosing the
Condorcet winner constitutes a locational equilibrium in the two-
player game.
Now, let us apply Proposition 1 to test whether the two-player
results mentioned in the previous paragraph are robust. If both
players locate on the same object, say q 2 X, there is only one hin-
terland consisting of all the nodes, i.e., PðsÞ ¼ fXg. Therefore, only
Condition (1.) of Proposition 1 applies and it simpliﬁes to
n
2P wðbZÞ ¼ wðCq1Þ, which is exactly the deﬁnition of the median.12
Now, consider the setting where the players choose different posi-
tions, say x and x0 2 X. Eiselt and Laporte (1991) show that this is a
locational equilibrium only if the positions are either neighboring
or the competitive zone between them has weight 0 and, further-
more, n2 ¼ wðCx1Þ ¼ wðCx
0
1 Þ holds. Applying conditions (3.) and (4.) of
Proposition 1 yields that this is robust, too.
In Eiselt and Laporte (1993) the authors examine the case of
three players on a tree. In their main result they distinguish four
different cases: (i) type A equilibria (all players cluster on the med-
ian q 2 X), (ii) type B equilibria (two players locate on the median q
and one in the heaviest component Cq1 2 Z on the node that is
neighboring to q), (iii) type C equilibria (all three players on differ-
ent nodes), and (iv) non-existence of equilibria. With the condi-
tions given in Eiselt and Laporte (1993) it is easy to check that
type A and type B equilibria are indeed robust. However, type C
equilibria generically are not. They are robust only if the hinterland
of all players has the same weight because otherwise Condition (4.)
of Proposition 1 would be violated.
Note that in the previous examples the equilibria are
robust only if some kind of minimal differentiation is satisﬁed
and at least some players choose the median q. Therefore these
results raise some questions regarding the general form of robust
equilibria.10 Moreover, for trees a node q is a median if and only if q 2 argmin Py2Xdðx; yÞwyn
x 2 Xg (see Goldman, 1971), i.e., a median q is a minimizer of the weighted sum
of graph distances, which holds true for all possible edge lengths. On general
graphs there are multiple conventions for the notion ‘median’: sometimes it is
deﬁned (rather than characterized) as the minimizer of the weighted sum of graph
distances.
11 Later Hansen, Thisse, and Wendell (1986) extended this work.
12 In fact, this has already been shown for the continuous line, although in very
different terms, by the seminal contribution of Black (1948). He proved that for
single-peaked preferences on a line the median is always a Condorcet winner. As
already mentioned in Section 2, single-peaked preferences on a line are is equivalent
to our assumption of heterogeneous edge lengths on the line graph.3.2. Minimal differentiation
Minimal differentiation is one of the most controversial results
and much attention has been devoted to its validity.13 In the frame-
work of graphs, we deﬁne minimal differentiation as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. A strategy proﬁle s 2 S satisﬁes minimal differenti-
ation if all players locate on the same node, i.e., s ¼ ðx; x; . . . ; xÞ for
some x 2 X.
In the previous section there were already examples for robust
equilibria satisfying minimal differentiation for two or three play-
ers.14 These cases can be extended to arbitrary numbers of players in
a straightforward way. Consider the strategy proﬁle s :¼ ðx; x; . . . ; xÞ
where all players locate on a node x 2 X. We then have only one hin-
terland consisting of all the nodes, i.e.,PðsÞ ¼ fXg. By using the same
arguments as in the two-player case one can see that Conditions (2.),
(3.), and (4.) of Proposition 1 do not apply and, furthermore, Condi-
tion (1.) simpliﬁes to npP wðbZÞ, where bZ is the heaviest unoccupied
zone. Thus, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let ðX; E;wÞ be a node-weighted graph and q 2 X.
Furthermore, let Cq1 2 Z be a heaviest component of ðX; EÞ  fqg. The
strategy proﬁle s ¼ ðq; . . . ; qÞ is a robust equilibrium if and only if the
weight of any component of ðX; EÞ  fqg is not higher than the average
payoff, i.e., wðCq1Þ 6 np.
Corollary 1 shows that it is easy to construct a robust equilib-
rium for any number of players. The result is also easy to prove
without Proposition 1 since for s ¼ ðq; . . . ; qÞ every player earns
the average payoff np, while the most beneﬁcial deviation leads to
the heaviest unoccupied zone Cq1. Phrased differently, if the heavi-
est component of the graph without q 2 X is relatively light, then
there exists a robust equilibrium where all players locate on the
same node. In particular, this also implies that q has to be a median
of the graph.
Note that in the robust equilibria discussed so far all players are
located on or next to the median. Therefore one might suspect that
in any robust equilibrium the median must be occupied (if it
exists) and that the players cluster on or around it. The following
example is a counter-example to this conjecture.
Example 2. Let ðX; E;wÞ be the weighted line graph depicted in
Fig. 5.
Furthermore assume that two players locate on each of the
nodes with weight 33. As it is easy to check, this strategy proﬁle is
a robust equilibrium. The median, however, is the node with a
weight of four and it belongs to a competitive zone. Thus, neither
minimal differentiation is satisﬁed, nor are players located on the
median.
However, consider a reduced game where we remove the two
nodes to the right and we remove the two players in this area. In13 Some works show that generically it is not satisﬁed (see, e.g., d’Aspremont et al.,
1979; Eaton & Lipsey, 1975; Economides, 1986) but others support it for special cases
(see, e.g., de Palma et al., 1985, 1990; Hehenkamp & Wambach, 2010). Similar
considerations also apply to minimal differentiation on graphs.
14 Deﬁnition 4 captures minimal differentiation in a strong sense. A weaker version
of minimal differentiation would be the requirement that there is no unoccupied
node between any pair of occupied nodes or, equivalently, that there is no
competitive zone.
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remaining two players both locate on the node with 33 agents such
as in the current strategy proﬁle. Moreover, this node is the median
of the reduced graph. A similar observation can be made when
reducing the game by removing ‘‘the left part’’.
Example 2 shows that in a robust equilibrium it need not be the
case that playersminimally differentiate on themedian. However, it
seems that locally, in a kind of reduced game, this is still true. To
investigate this issue, let us formally deﬁne a reduced game. Given
a strategy proﬁle s 2 S, we deﬁne a reduced game for every occupied
node x 2 X by considering the objects andplayers in the neighboring
area Ax#X. Thus, the number of players in the reduced game is px
and the graph is restricted to ðAx; EjAx Þ. For the payoffs only those
agents are considered whose favorite object belongs to the neigh-
boring areaAx such that thenodeweights of the graph in the reduced
game coincide to the node weights of the original game.
Corollary 2 (Reduced Games). Suppose s 2 S is a robust equilibrium
for some ðX; E;wÞ and let x 2 X be an occupied position such that
px P 2. Then, x is the median of the subgraph ðAx; EjAx Þ and ðx; x; . . . ; xÞ
is a robust equilibrium satisfying minimal differentiation in the
corresponding reduced game.15 These might be inhabitants that visit a facility or consumers who buy a product.
Because we have not speciﬁed a second stage like government formation in our
model, the discussion of efﬁciency does not apply to the context of voting.
16 The sum of squared distances as an efﬁciency criterion has been used, for
example, by Król (2012) and Meagher and Zauner (2004) who ﬁnd different effects of
uncertainty on efﬁciency.
17 A different notion of ‘‘robustness’’ addresses the question of whether bounds for
the price of anarchy with respect to Nash equilibria extend to weaker notions of
equilibrium (Roughgarden, 2009). The fact that in our game it is possible to construct
examples of robust equilibria with an inﬁnite price of anarchy implies that, without
additional assumptions, bounds for weaker notions of equilibrium cannot be found,
either.Proof. Let x 2 X be an occupied position in s 2 S with px P 2.
Applying Proposition 1, Condition (1.) implies wðAxÞpx P
wðHxÞ
px
P wðZÞ
for every unoccupied zone surrounding x. But this is equivalent
to the condition of Corollary 1, wðCx1ÞP wðAÞpx , which shows that
the strategy proﬁle ðx; . . . ; xÞ is a robust equilibrium in the reduced
game. Moreover, this condition implies that the weight of the
heaviest component of ðAx; EjAx Þ  fxg is smaller than wðAxÞ2 which
shows that x 2 X is the median of the subgraph ðAx; EjAx Þ. h
Corollary 2 shows that in any robust equilibrium a local variant
of minimal differentiation is satisﬁed. This ﬁnding is fully in line
with the ‘‘principle of local clustering’’ conjectured in the seminal
work of Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Their principle, however, also
contains the aspect that players pair, i.e., do not locate away from
other ﬁrms. This aspect is also true in robust equilibria since it fol-
lows from Condition (3.) of Proposition 1 that isolated players do
not neighbor a non-trivial competitive zone. This implies that sin-
gly occupied nodes must neighbor another occupied node if node
weights are strictly positive. Thus, any robust equilibrium can be
characterized as a few multiply occupied nodes which are possibly
neighbored by some singly occupied nodes. The ﬁnal question on
the extent of differentiation is whether these local clusters can
be at a large distance from each other.
In Example 2 only a small share of agents favor the object
between the occupied positions. In fact, it holds generally that
the weight of competitive zones in robust equilibria must be rela-
tively light.
Proposition 2 (Competitive zones). Let ðX; E;wÞ be a node-weighted
graph. Suppose s 2 S is a robust equilibrium and let Y be the set of
competitive zones. Then,
P
Y2YwðYÞ 6 n5.
The proof can be found in the appendix. By deﬁnition, a strategy
proﬁle satisﬁes minimal differentiation only if there is no compet-
itive zone. In this context, Proposition 2 can be interpreted as a
weaker form of a global minimal differentiation result: competitive
zones might exist in equilibrium, but their weight in sum is
bounded by n5, i.e., at most 20% of the agents can have their favorite
object in some competitive zone.
The requirement of robustness is crucial for each of the results
on minimal differentiation. Indeed, it is possible to ﬁnd (non-
robust) locational equilibria which do not satisfy the propertiesspeciﬁed by Corollaries 1 and 2, and Proposition 2. Whether
robustness also leads to stronger results with respect to efﬁciency
is addressed next.
3.3. (In-)efﬁciency
Traditionally, welfare is measured by aggregating the players’
and the agents’ surplus. However, from the players’ perspective,
in our setting (i.e., without considering price competition) any
strategy proﬁle yields the same aggregated surplus as we study a
constant-sum game. Therefore, efﬁciency will be discussed from
the viewpoint of the agents which are interpreted as consumers
in this subsection.15 The standard result of two ﬁrms choosing the
median of a line is known to be inefﬁcient since minimal differenti-
ation leads to unnecessarily high distances for the consumers. In his
paper, Hotelling complains about this inefﬁciency:
‘‘Buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness
[. . .]’’ and ‘‘[. . .] competing sellers tend to become too much
alike.’’ (Hotelling, 1929, p. 54)
This result, however, does not simply generalize. Reconsider
Example 1 where some agents are uniformly distributed along a
cycle graph with equal edge lengths. The (non-robust) locational
equilibrium depicted in Fig. 2 is efﬁcient with respect to different
criteria. For instance, it minimizes the sum of distances (of each
consumer to a closest player) as well as the sum of squared dis-
tances, which are the most common cardinal criteria.16 However,
the cardinal approach does not seem to be fully justiﬁed in our con-
text as we have individual distance perceptions which need not be
comparable across consumers. A well-known ordinal criterion is Par-
eto efﬁciency. The locational equilibrium in Example 1 satisﬁes this
criterion as well, i.e., there does not exist another strategy proﬁle
such that any consumer is at least as well off and at least one con-
sumer is strictly better off (where better off here means that the per-
ceived distance to the closest player becomes shorter). Note that this
is a weak requirement which is satisﬁed by plenty of strategy pro-
ﬁles. The existence of locational equilibria that are efﬁcient therefore
raises the question of whether robust equilibria can be efﬁcient as
well. Under generic conditions, the answer is no.
Proposition 3 (Pareto efﬁciency). Let ðX; E;wÞ be a node-weighted
graph. Suppose that the number of agents n is not divisible by the
number of players p and that there are at least p nodes with positive
weight wx > 0. Then any robust equilibrium is Pareto dominated (for
the consumers).
Proposition 3 shows that under mild conditions robust equilib-
ria are not Pareto efﬁcient. This statement of inefﬁciency with
respect to an ordinal criterion precludes efﬁciency with respect
to cardinal criteria as well since no Pareto dominated strategy pro-
ﬁle can minimize the sum of (squared) distances. Moreover, simi-
larly to the analysis of Gur, Saban, and Stier-Moses (2012), the
price of anarchy (cf. Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, 2009) can be
arbitrarily high in speciﬁc examples in our model.17 The proof of
Proposition 3 is relegated to the appendix. Its intuition is simple.
Fig. 6. Four players on two nodes. If this is a robust equilibrium, then node x must have high weight. This is not necessarily true for x0 because it has a high degree (which
leads to several arms in its hinterland).
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choose the same location, while the consumers would beneﬁt if
one of them located at a different position. In fact, as we have a con-
stant-sum game between the players, a social planner could relocate
them and provide transfer payments to keep their payoffs constant.
Thus, a socially optimal outcome from the consumers’ point of view
would be possible without changing the payoffs of the players.18
This shows that, in a much more general form, Hotelling’s
inefﬁciency persists when robustness is required.
3.4. (Non-)existence of robust equilibria
So far we analyzed properties of robust equilibria without
explicitly examining under which conditions they exist. In
Section 3.1, we have shown for small numbers of players on tree
graphs that most of the sufﬁcient conditions from the literature
indeed induce robust equilibria. Moreover, Corollary 1 provides a
condition which is sufﬁcient for existence. Intuitively, it is satisﬁed
either if the weight is concentrated on the median or if we have a
star-like structure under a more equal weight distribution.
Although this condition is necessary and sufﬁcient only for robust
equilibria with minimal differentiation, similar considerations also
apply in general. Corollary 1 is based on Proposition 1 which char-
acterizes the underlying strategy proﬁles of robust equilibria.19 In
particular, Condition (1.) states that the hinterland Hx#X of every
occupied node x 2 X must be heavy enough to carry px players. If this
weight is not directly on the node x, then it must be on other nodes
in its hinterland. Considering the ‘‘arms’’ in the hinterland, i.e., the
components in the graph ðHx; EjHx Þ  fxg, each of them is an unoccu-
pied zone. However, for unoccupied zones the weight is bounded,
again by Proposition 1 Condition (1.). Thus, in order to be heavy
enough, an occupied node x 2 X must either have sufﬁciently many
arms in its hinterland (which are heavy in sum) or it must have a rel-
atively high weight itself. This intuition is formalized in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. For some node-weighted graph ðX; E;wÞ, let s 2 S be a
robust equilibrium with heaviest unoccupied zone bZ 2 Z (and
wðbZÞ > 0). Let x 2 X be occupied by 0 < px < p players. Denote by
ax 2 N the number of arms (i.e., the number of components in the
hinterland for ðHx; EjHx Þ  fxg) of x. Then
wx
wðbZÞ þ ax P px: ð4Þ
18 However, this result also depends on the abstraction from price competition. If
ﬁrms do not cluster, i.e., if they have a local monopoly, they might have an incentive
to raise prices.
19 Proposition 1 provides the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for existence in the
sense that a robust equilibrium exists if and only if there is a strategy proﬁle that
satisﬁes these conditions. Thus, this result transforms the problem of ﬁnding a
strategy proﬁle that is a robust equilibrium into ﬁnding a strategy proﬁle that satisﬁes
the conditions of Proposition 1, but it is not a result on the exogenously given
situation of spatial competition, i.e., on the node-weighted graph ðX; E;wÞ.Proof. Let bZx 2 Z be the heaviest unoccupied zone in the hinterland
of x 2 X. The result then follows from Proposition 1 Condition (1.):
wðHxÞP pxwðbZÞ ) wx þ axwðcZxÞP pxwðbZÞ
) wx
wðbZÞ þ ax wð
cZxÞ
wðbZÞ
P px )
wx
wðbZÞ þ ax P px: 
Corollary 3 shows that in a robust equilibrium the relative
weight of an occupied node plus its number of arms must exceed
the number of players on it. This result is illustrated in Fig. 6 with
two occupied nodes x and x0 2 X.
While x has only one arm in its hinterland, x0 has four of them.
Therefore, for node x we have wx
wðbZ Þ þ 1P 2, which is equivalent to
wx P wðbZÞ, i.e., the weight of the node must exceed the weight of
the heaviest unoccupied zone. Note that this implies an inequality
of weights if there are unoccupied zones with many nodes. In con-
trast to this, x0 needs not be as heavy as x, but in order to have four
arms it must be a cut vertex and have a degree larger than
ﬁve. Thus, one interpretation for Corollary 3 is that the weight of
occupied nodes and their degree can be interpreted as some kind
of substitutes: at least one of them has to be high enough in order
to carry px players in equilibrium.
This gives a requirement for robust equilibria on the level of sin-
gle nodes. On the graph level this requirement will translate into
(a) structural features of the graph and in (b) conditions on the dis-
tribution of weights. To assess the weight distribution, we consider
the inequality of weights measured by the variance. In our case it is
given by VarðwÞ ¼Px2X wx  nn 2 ¼ 1nPx2Xw2x  n2n2 . The variance is
the quadratic distance from the uniform distribution. In particular,
VarðwÞ ¼ 0 if and only if wx ¼ nn for all x 2 X, i.e., if and only if w is
uniformly distributed (a special case that is predominantly dis-
cussed in the literature). To assess structural requirements of a
graph we consider its connectedness which is measured by the
number of blocks b (cf. Diestel, 2005). If this number is smaller
than the number of players p, then it is still impossible to have
Equation (4) trivially satisﬁed (such as for node x0 in Fig. 6). For
these graphs Corollary 3 has implications on the weight distribu-
tion because there must be an occupied node that is similar to node
x in Fig. 6. As a consequence, we have that graphs with a high con-
nectivity (i.e., a relatively small number of blocks) only admit
robust equilibria if the weight distribution is far from uniform.
Proposition 4. Let ðX; E;wÞ be a node-weighted graph with n > 3p.
Suppose that the number of blocks is smaller than the number of
players, i.e., b < p. Then there exists some m > 0 such that VarðwÞ < m
implies that a robust equilibrium does not exist.
514 B. Buechel, N. Roehl / European Journal of Operational Research 240 (2015) 505–517The interpretation of this result is as follows: suppose the graph
is not too small (n > 3p) and the distribution of agents is sufﬁ-
ciently close to the uniform distribution. Then the existence of
robust equilibria requires a low connectivity of the underlying
graph in terms of that there must be more blocks than players.
Proposition 4 obviously applies to all graphs with just one block
(i.e., b ¼ 1) like grids, for instance. Those graphs are known as two-
connected and they are characterized by not containing any cut
vertex (see, e.g., Diestel, 2005). Indeed, in this case we have
ax ¼ 0 for any occupied node x 2 X (and for any s 2 S). Thus, if a
two-connected graph is sufﬁciently large, it always satisﬁes the
requirements of Proposition 4 and therefore it does not admit
robust equilibria if the weight distribution is too close to unifor-
mity.20 A particular example of this class of graphs are cycle graphs
(as illustrated in Fig. 2) which have been studied extensively by
Mavronicolas et al. (2008). Given a uniform distribution of agents
(and edge lengths), the authors have shown that there always exists
a Nash equilibrium for n > 3p. However, Proposition 4 immediately
implies that these equilibria are not robust.
For tree graphs Proposition 4 does not apply since trees consist
of many blocks. However, for this special class the number of arms
is also restricted by some structural property. Since there are no
cycles in a tree, each arm in any hinterland leads to a node of
degree 1, a so-called loose end. Therefore, completely analogous
to Proposition 4 we can show the following.
Proposition 5. Let ðX; EÞ be a node-weighted tree with n > 3p.
Suppose that e < p, where e is the number of loose ends. Then there
exists some m > 0 such that VarðwÞ < m implies that no robust
equilibrium exists.
The number of loose ends is a structural feature that is related
to the equality of the degree distribution of the graph. The lowest
number of loose ends in a tree is attained in the line graph (which
has a highly equal degree distribution), while the highest number
is attained in the star graph (which has a highly unequal degree
distribution). In that sense, Proposition 5 shows that the existence
of a robust equilibrium on a tree requires either an unequal distri-
bution of weight or an unequal distribution of degree.
To sum up, robust equilibria certainly exist for structures that
are similar to a star graph (Corollary 1) or have a highly concen-
trated distribution of weights. However, for graphs with few cut
vertices (i.e., graphs with a low number of blocks) and for tree
graphs, robust equilibria can exist only if the weight distribution
is not close to uniform. To consider a numerical example for the
required inequality: for trees that satisfy the condition e < p of
Proposition 5 and for cycle graphs (which always satisfy the condi-
tion b < p of Proposition 4) we can show that there only exists a
robust equilibrium of three or more players if there is a node
x 2 X that is at least np 1 times heavier than some other node
x0 2 X. Thus, if the number of nodes strongly exceeds the number
of players in the game (i.e., n p), those one-dimensional struc-
tures do not admit robust equilibria if the weights are uniformly
distributed.
4. Discussion
Models of spatial competition predominantly deal with three
important applications: (i) ﬁrms that strategically locate facilities
(e.g., Eiselt & Laporte, 1993), (ii) political candidates who strategi-20 The result that two-connected graphs require a sufﬁcient inequality of node
weights can also be derived from Proposition 2. Since in two-connected graphs any
unoccupied node belongs to a competitive zone, Proposition 2 implies that we have
wðXÞP 45n in robust equilibria. Thus, there must be at least one node x with wx P 45 np.
That is, to reach an average payoff np it is almost enough to attract all agents with
favorite object x.cally choose a political platform (e.g., de Palma et al., 1990), and
(iii) ﬁrms that strategically choose a product speciﬁcation (e.g.,
Eaton & Lipsey, 1975). In any of the model variations it has been
standardly assumed that agents are heterogeneous with respect
to their ideal point (i.e., location/policy/product), but homoge-
neous with respect to the perception of distances. In particular, it
must hold that two agents with the same ideal point agree on
the ranking of all the other alternatives. In this paper, we have
introduced a way to relax this strong homogeneity requirement
by considering individual distance perceptions. We assess whether
model predictions are robust in the sense that they are indepen-
dent of the perceived distances. Thereby, we conﬁrm robustness
of the equilibria found for two and three players on a tree graph
by Eiselt and Laporte (1991, 1993). And we ﬁnd strong support
for a conjecture of the ‘‘principle of local clustering’’ articulated
by Eaton and Lipsey (1975, p. 46) who further explain that ‘‘[t]he
principle of minimum differentiation is a special case of the princi-
ple of local clustering when the number of ﬁrms in the market is
restricted to two.’’ In fact, we have shown that all robust equilibria
satisfy local clustering in the sense that we have minimal differen-
tiation in each reduced game. An implication of this result is that
robust locational choices are not Pareto efﬁcient, which is in line
with Hotelling’s conjecture. On the other hand, not all results from
models of spatial competition are robust with respect to heteroge-
neous distance perceptions. Especially in graphs without cut verti-
ces the existence of robust equilibria is highly restricted. We
illustrate this in an example of uniform distribution of agents along
a cycle graph (analyzed by Mavronicolas et al., 2008). Indeed, by
discussing general structural conditions for the existence of robust
equilibria, we have shown that the existence generically requires a
highly unequal distribution of agents. This also raises the question
whether there are robust outcomes in the three main applications
mentioned at the beginning of this section. For example, Proposi-
tion 2 implies that at most 20% of the agents may have their favor-
ite object ‘‘between’’ the players. Interestingly, some empirical
data on the geographical distribution of inhabitants suggests that
the necessary inequality requirements might just be satisﬁed.
According to the United Nations report from 2012 the rate of
urbanization in more developed regions was about 78% in 2011
and it is still increasing.21 In the US it was even higher than 82%,
for example. Thus, the population in more developed regions is quite
unequally distributed and this suggests that if ﬁrms serve only the
major cities this might well be a robust equilibrium, despite the inef-
ﬁciency for consumers who live outside these cities. In the case of
product or policy spaces, the exact distribution of consumers is still
an open question. But if it should not meet the requirements of
robust equilibria, this would lead again to our main motivation that
the assumption of homogeneous distances can have a strong impact
on the results. In this case, the use of models of spatial competition
in these applications has to be reconsidered carefully.
Although we have focused in this paper on just one – yet crucial
– aspect of robustness, several other model speciﬁcations can be
challenged as well. Some of them do not substantially inﬂuence
our results. For instance, if the assumption that the players do
not locate on the edges of the graph was relaxed, then for any
robust equilibrium in this more general set-up there exists another
one where the players only locate on the vertices and each of them
attracts the same set of agents. Moreover, these additional equilib-
ria exist only under very restrictive conditions. Another aspect that
could be relaxed is the assumption that ties are broken equally in
the case of equal distances. Although it would then be necessary to
adapt the formulations of the results, their substance would not
change. The reason is that robust equilibria are independent of21 United Nations, DESA (2012). World urbanization prospects: the 2011 revision.
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only if two players locate at the same position.
On the other hand, however, there are also further assumptions
which might well play an important role. In particular, we study a
simultaneous move game, while models of sequential moves lead
to quite different predictions about minimal differentiation (e.g.,
Loertscher & Muehlheusser, 2011; Prescott & Visscher, 1977),
when more than two players are involved.22 A further major mod-
eling decision is whether continuous or discrete space is considered.
We have contributed to bridging the two corresponding literatures,
but it is left for future research to clarify the role of this modeling
assumption; for instance, by approximating a continuous space by
a discrete space of shrinking steps.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Let s 2 S be a robust equilibrium and
x 2 X be the position with lowest worst-case payoff, i.e.,
wðHxÞ
px
6 wðHxÞpx for all x 2 X. Then Proposition 1 Condition (2.) implies
wðHxÞP
px
px þ 1
wðAxÞ ¼
px
px þ 1
wðHxÞ þ
X
Y2Y; Y #Ax
wðYÞ
 !
P
px
px þ 1
wðHxÞ þ
px
px þ 1
X
Y2Y; Y #Ax
wðYÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼:wðYxÞ
and, consequently, wðHxÞP pxwðYxÞ for all x 2 X n fxg, where wðYxÞ
is the aggregated weight of competitive zones surrounding x 2 X.
Case 1: px ¼ 1.
Here, Proposition 1 Condition (3.) implieswðYÞ ¼ 0 for all Y#Ax
and, thus, wðHxÞP pxwðYxÞ ¼ 0. Then:
n ¼
X
x2X
wðHxÞ þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞP
X
x2X
px 
wðHxÞ
px
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
P
X
x2X
px wðYxÞ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
¼0; if px¼1
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞP 2
X
x2X
wðYxÞ þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
P 2 2
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
 !
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ ¼ 5
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ;
where the last inequality is due to the fact that by deﬁnition of
competitive zones each Y 2 Y is neighboring to at least two
occupied positions.
Case 2: px P 2.22 Also in the literature on sequential location choices the questionable homoge-
neity assumption is standard. When relaxing this assumption one can ﬁnd simple
three-player examples where the equilibria are not robust.If px ¼ 1 for all x 2 X n fxg, again Condition (3.) from Proposition
1 implies wðYxÞ ¼ 0 for all x 2 X n fxg and there remains nothing to
show. Therefore, assume that there exists at least one x0 2 X n fxg
with px0 P 2. Again, one can exploit Proposition 1 Condition (2.):
wðHxÞP
px
px0 þ 1
wðAx0 Þ () wðHxÞ
P pxwðAx0 Þ  px0wðHxÞ () wðHxÞ
P pxwðHx0 Þ  px0wðHxÞ þ pxwðYx0 Þ
and, analogously,
wðHx0 ÞP px0px þ 1
wðAxÞ () wðHx0 Þ
P px0wðHxÞ  pxwðHx0 Þ þ px0wðYxÞ:
Now, the rest of the proof proceeds similarly to Case 1. Accord-
ing to (1) we can again decompose the graph in hinterlands
and competitive zones and by using wðHxÞP pxwðYxÞ for all
x 2 X n fxg one gets
n ¼ wðHxÞ þwðHx0 Þ þ
X
x2Xnfx;x0g
wðHxÞ þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
P pxwðHx0 Þ  px0wðHxÞ þ pxwðYx0 Þ þ px0wðHxÞ  pxwðHx0 Þ
þ px0wðYxÞ þ
X
x2Xnfx;x0g
px 
wðHxÞ
px
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
P pxwðYx0 Þ þ px0wðYxÞ þ
X
x2Xnfx;x0g
px wðYxÞ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
¼0; if px¼1
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
P 2
X
x2X
wðYxÞ þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞP 2 2
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
 !
þ
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ
¼ 5
X
Y2Y
wðYÞ:
Again, the last inequality holds because each Y 2 Y is neighbor-
ing to at least two occupied positions. hProof of Proposition 3. Let ðX; E;wÞ be a node-weighted graph and
suppose np R N. We ﬁrst show that in any robust equilibrium s
 2 S
there is at least one node multiply occupied.
Suppose the opposite is true: there is a robust equilibrium s 2 S
with only singly occupied nodes, i.e., px ¼ 1 for all x 2 X. Consider
two occupied nodes x; x0 2 X which are directly or indirectly
neighboring. Condition (4.) of Proposition 1 then reads
wðHxÞP w Ax0ð Þ1 P w Hx0ð Þ1 andw Hx0ð ÞP wðAxÞ1 P wðHxÞ1 which implies that
wðHxÞ ¼ w Hx0ð Þ. Since the graph ðX; EÞ is connected, any occupied
node x 2 X is a direct or indirect neighbor of at least one other
occupied node and the relation of being a (direct or indirect)
neighbor connects all occupied nodes. Therefore, we have
wðHxÞ ¼ w Hx0ð Þ for all x; x0 2 X. Moreover, Condition (3.) of Propo-
sition 1 implies that all competitive zones must have a weight of
zero (because they have a singly occupied node as a neighbor) such
that
P
x2X wðHxÞ ¼ n. Taken together, this yields wðHxÞ ¼ np for any
x 2 X. However, since the weight of each hinterland is determined
by a number of agents, we must havewðHxÞ 2 N, which contradicts
our assumption that np R N.
Thus, in every robust equilibrium there needs to be a multiply
occupied node, say x 2 X. Since at least p nodes have a positive
weight, there exists an unoccupied node, say ~x 2 X n X, withw~x > 0.
Changing the strategy of one player with sc ¼ x to ~sc ¼ ~x is a Pareto
improvement because all consumers with x^i ¼ ~x are better off. h
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opposite is true: that is, assume there exists a robust equilibrium
s 2 S. Let bZ 2 Z be the heaviest unoccupied zone with respect to
s. Given the requirements of the proposition, we will show that
in each robust equilibrium there exists an occupied node which
is heavier than bZ . If the variance becomes small, this leads to a con-
tradiction. The proof proceeds in ﬁve steps:
Step 1: The  m-criterion.
Consider the mapping k  k1 : Rn ! Rwith kwk1 ¼
P
x2X jwxj
also known as the Manhattan norm. It is well-know that
k  k1 is continuous. Thus, for all  > 0 there exists some
m > 0 such that kww0k2 < m implies kww0k1 <  for
all w;w0 2 Rn, where kww0k2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃP
x2Xðwx w0xÞ2
q
is, as
usual, the Euclidean norm. Let  :¼ 2p5ðpþ1Þ  nn. Furthermore,
in the following let w0 be the uniform distribution w0x :¼ nn
for all x 2 X.23 Having speciﬁed these variables, the  m-
criterion from above implies that there exists some
m :¼ m2 > 0 such that from
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VarðwÞp ¼ kww0k2 < ﬃﬃﬃmp
always
P
x2X jwx  nn j <  ¼ 2p5ðpþ1Þ  nn follows. Correspondingly,
for the rest of the proof it is assumed that there is given a
tupel of node weights ðwxÞx2X (i.e., wP 0 and
P
x2Xwx ¼ n)
with VarðwÞ < m.
Step 2: We establish that wðbXÞ  jbX j nn  <  for all bX #X.
If VarðwÞ < m, Step 1 implies for all subsets bX #X;
wðbXÞ  jbX j nn  ¼ Px2bX wx  nn   6Px2bX wx  nn  6Px2X
wx  nn
  < .
Step 3: We establish that
P
x2Xax 6 b.
The main intuition of this step is that all unoccupied zones
can be covered by blocks of the graph and we will show
that minimal covers of different zones have to be disjoint.
Let Zx – Zx0 be two unoccupied zones in the hinterland of x
and x0, respectively, where x; x0 2 X. Note that x ¼ x0 is
allowed but, nevertheless, the two zones may not be equal.
If it is not possible to ﬁnd such two zones,
P
x2X ax 6 1 and
there remains nothing to show. According to Section 2, let
B be the set of blocks. Obviously, X ¼ SB2BB holds. There-
fore there exist BZx ;BZx0 #B with Zx#
S
B2BZx B and
Zx0 #
S
B2BZx0 B such that both sets are minimal with respect
to inclusion, i.e., bB(BZx implies ZxS
B2bBB (analogously
for bB(BZx0 ). Given the construction of blocks, the two sets
BZx and BZx0 must be disjoint because otherwise there
would be a path from Zx to Z
0
x0 not passing through x and
x0, which is not possible due to the deﬁnition of hinter-
lands. Thus:23 Bec
always
node-wX
x2X
ax ¼
X
x2X
X
Zx2Z; Zx #Hx
1 6
X
x2X
X
Zx2Z; Zx #Hx
BZx  6 jBj ¼ b:
Step 4: We establish that wx0 P wðbZÞ for some x0 2 X.
As already has been shown in Step 3, the number of hinter-
lands is bounded by b and, thus,
P
x2Xax 6 b < p ¼
P
x2Xpx.
Therefore, there exists some x0 2 X with ax0 6 px0  1 and
by applying Corollary 3 this yields wx P wðbZÞ. In words:
there necessarily exists an occupied node which is heavier
than the heaviest unoccupied zone.ause the fraction nn need not be an integer, the uniform distribution cannot
be induced by allocating n agents to nodes. Still, it is possible to study the
eighted graph ðX; E;w0 Þ.Step 5: The ﬁnal contradiction.
Since the number of hinterlands is smaller than the num-
ber of players and because of Proposition 2, the average
weight of unoccupied zones in hinterlands needs to be rel-
atively high:wðbZÞP Px2XwðHxÞ wðXÞP
x2Xax|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
average weight of unoccupied zones in hinterlands
>
4
5nwðXÞ
p
:Moreover, according to Step 4 this implies that x0 must be relatively
heavy as well, wx0 >
4
5nwðXÞ
p . But then from Step 2 it follows thatn
n
þ  >
4
5 n
n
n  jXj nn þ 
 
p
P
12
5 p
n
n  p nn  
p
¼ 7n
5n
 
p
;which contradicts  ¼ 2p5ðpþ1Þ  nn. Therefore, s cannot be a robust equi-
librium. h
Appendix B. ‘‘Dummy nodes’’
To additionally motivate heterogeneous distances, we brieﬂy
discuss a model variation that is based on homogeneous distances.
Indeed, it is possible to represent any situation covered by hetero-
geneous distances by using additional nodes (‘‘dummy nodes’’)
together with homogeneous distances. However, it turns out that
then the fundamental relation between the objects, i.e., the spatial
structure of the model, might become completely irrelevant.
To formalize this claim, recall that in our model a graph ðX; EÞ
consists of a (ﬁnite) set of nodes (objects) Xwhich ﬁnd an interpre-
tation as geographical locations, political platforms, or product
speciﬁcations; and of a set of links E#X  X, which represent the
basic relations between the objects. Now, consider a set of addi-
tional nodes (‘‘dummy nodes’’) A and a set of additional links
E#A ðX [ AÞ that do not have these interpretations, but only
serve to make the model more ﬂexible. That is, the preferences of
each agent i 2 N are deﬁned over the set of objects X only, but
not over the dummy nodes A. The extended graph is then given
by ðXA; EAÞ :¼ ðX [ A; E [ EÞ. Consider, furthermore, homogeneously
determined edge lengths ðdeÞe2E > 0 and ðdeÞe2E > 0. We say that
the triple ðXA; EAÞ; ðdeÞe2E; ðdeÞe2E represents the agents’ preferences
ðiÞi2N if there are node weights ðwxÞx2X[A (i.e., a distribution of
the agents’ favorite objects) such that diðxÞ 6 diðyÞ if and only if
xiy for all x; y 2 X and i 2 N (analogously to Section 2.2).
Proposition B.1. Let an underlying graph ðX; EÞ and  2 R>0 be
given. Suppose there is a set of agents N such that each agent i 2 N
has complete and transitive preferences i over the elements in X.
Then there exists a set of dummy nodes A, an extended graph
ðXA; EAÞ, and (homogeneous) edge lengths deð Þe2E such that
ðXA; EAÞ; ðdeÞe2E; ðdeÞe2E represents the agents’ preferences for any
tuple of edge lengths deð Þe2E with de >  for all e 2 E.Proof. Deﬁne A :¼ faiji 2 Ng and E :¼ X  A. For all xa 2 X  A
choose dxa such that 2 < dxa < ; and dxai 6 dx0ai if and only if xix0
for all x; x0 2 X and i 2 N. Moreover, for each agent i 2 N, let ai 2 A
be his favorite object. Since by construction the direct link between
any two nodes x 2 X and a 2 A is always the shortest path between
them, it can be checked easily that ðXA; EAÞ; ðdeÞe2E; ðdeÞe2E
 
indeed
represents the agents’ preferences for any tuple of edge lengths
deð Þe2E with de >  for all e 2 E. h
Proposition B.1 shows that it is possible to cover each and every
proﬁle of preferences by means of homogeneous distances. For
each agent, we can simply add a dummy node and construct links
between this node and every object which become ‘‘his’’ shortest
B. Buechel, N. Roehl / European Journal of Operational Research 240 (2015) 505–517 517paths. The underlying graph ðX; EÞ – capturing the basic relations
between geographical locations, respectively, political platforms
or product speciﬁcations – is then fully irrelevant since no shortest
path uses those links (given that the edge lengths do not converge
to zero). Thus, allowing for dummy nodes induces a high degree of
arbitrariness and the model loses its explanatory power. Other
ways of introducing dummy nodes, e.g. constructing only tree
graphs, somewhat mitigate this issue but can be shown to restrict
generality.
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